Areas: Microeconomics, Experimental Economics
Mark Van Boening received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Arizona, and he joined the faculty in 1990. He teaches intermediate and graduate level microeconomics. His main area of research is empirical analysis of microeconomic behavior, primarily through laboratory (experimental) methods. Current areas of interest include bargaining and markets. Professor Van Boening’s research has appeared in the Economic Journal, the American Economic Review, the Journal of Labor, and the Journal of Law & Economics.
Ph.D., Economics, University of Arizona, 1991. (V.L. Smith, dissertation chair)
M.A., Wichita State University, 1985
B.A., Philosophy, Wichita State University, 1980
“Fairness in an Embedded Ultimatum Game,” with P. Pecorino, Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 53, No. 2, May 2010, pp. 263 – 287.
“Determinants of Government Aid to Katrina Survivors: Evidence from Survey Data,” W.F. Chappell, R.G. Forgette and D.A. Swanson, Southern Economic Journal, vol. 74, no. 2, October 2007, pp. 344-362.
“Benefits Packages and Individual Behavior: Choices over Discrete Goods with Multiple Attributes,” with T.F. Blackstone, M. McKee and E. Rütstrom, Managerial and Decision Economics, vol. 27, no. 6, September 2006, pp. 511-526.
“A Limit of Bilateral Contracting Institution,” with N. T. Wilcox, Economic Inquiry, vol. 43, no. 4, October 2005, pp.840-85.
“An Empirical Analysis of Bargaining with Voluntary Transmission of Private Information,” with P.Pecorino, Journal of Legal Studies, Jean Love, vol. 33, no. 1, January 2004, pp. 131-156.
“Avoidable Cost: Can Collusion Succeed Where Competition Fails?” with G. Archibald and N.T. Wilcox,Research in Experimental Economics: Experiments Investigating Market Power, vol. 9, R. Mark Isaac and Charles Holt, eds., 2002, pp. 271-242.
“Bargaining and Information: An Empirical Analysis of a Multistage Arbitration Game,” with P. Pecorino, Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 19, no. 4, October 2001, pp. 992-948.
“Dividend Timing and Behavior in Laboratory Asset Markets,” with V. L. Smith and C. P. Wellford,Economics Theory, vol. 16, no. 3, 2000, pp. 567-583.
“Speculation in Experimental Markets for Emission Permits,” with T. N. Cason and S. R. Elliott, Research in Experimental Economics, R. Mark Isaac and Charles Holt, eds., vol. 7, 1999, pp.93-119.
“Numerical Computation of Equilibrium Bid Functions in a First-Price Auction with Heterogeneous Risk Attitudes,” with S. J. Rassenti and V. L.Smith, Experimental Economics, vol. 1, no. 2, 1998, pp.147-159.
“Can Core Allocations Be Achieved in Avoidable Fixed Cost Environments Using Two-Part Price Competition?”with Y. Durham, S. Rassenti, V. L. Smith, and N. T. Wilcox, Annals of Operations Research, vol. 68, 1996, pp. 61-88.
“Avoidable Cost: Ride a Double Auction Roller Coaster,” with N. T. Wilcox, American Economic Review, vol. 6, no. 3, June 1996, pp. 461-477.
“Price Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Call Markets,” with A. W. Williams and S. LaMaster, Economics Letters,vol. 41, 1993, pp. 179-185.
“The Robustness of Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Markets,” with R. L. King, V. L. Smith, and A. W. Williams, Nonlinear Dynamics and Evolutionary Economics, Richard H. Day and Ping Chen, eds., Oxford Press, 1993.
“Off-Floor Trading, Disintegration, and the Bid-Ask Spread in Experimental Markets,” with J. M. Campbell, T. S. LaMaster, and V. L. Smith, Journal of Business, vol. 64, no. 4, October 1991, pp. 495-522.
“An Experimental Examination of Spot-Markets for Electricity,” with R. W. Hahn, Economic Journal,, Vol. 100, No. 403 (December 1990), pp. 1073 – 1094.